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Abstract: Data from monitoring reports of the European Commission consistently indicate 
that Lithuania is among the best performers in transposing and implementing EU law. This 
article analyses whether this is really the case. Through two case studies – the second gas 
Directive 2003/55/EC and the closure of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant – the paper attempts 
to verify and explain the results of the monitoring report and finds that, in reality, 
implementation appears more problematic. Non-compliance due to neglect at the 
administrative level is not an issue, as the process of EU law implementation in Lithuania is 
well organized. Special planning and monitoring mechanisms and tools developed to ensure 
transposition and implementation of the acquis remained in place in Lithuania after EU 
accession. On the other hand, these mechanisms are unable to cope with cases of voluntary 
non-implementation, which is now practiced more often than previously. However, fear of
sanctions and reputational damage has replaced pre-accession conditionality as the main driver 
of compliance, and effectively limits the number of cases of voluntary non-implementation.  
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1. Introduction  
This article questions if Lithuania’s change of status from a candidate country to an EU 
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interesting in the context of post-accession compliance research. Data from monitoring reports 
of the European Commission consistently indicate that Lithuania is among the best performers 
in the transposition of EU law(1).  
Table 1 about here 
It is difficult to provide a straightforward answer to this question.  
z First, there is a lack of comparable data from the pre- and post-accession phases(2) .  
z Second, certain data for new member states are simply unavailable, as the time span of 
their membership has been brief. For example, very few infringement cases launched by 
the European Commission against new member states have been closed. This short time 
span prevents generalizations as observed tendencies might be idiosyncratic(3) .  
z And, third, it is difficult to track a state’s record of implementation because of 
methodological reasons(4) .  
As elsewhere in this special issue, we will distinguish between transposition, enforcement and 
application of EU law. This article, however, will deal primarily with transposition and 
enforcement(5) .  
The paper will begin with describing the functioning of conditionality in Lithuania during the 
pre-accession phase and developments in the post-accession period. Then, it will explore the 
sources of indicators suggesting Lithuania’s history of non-compliance and will provide a 
review of these possible sources. Third, this article will provide a selection of cases for an in-
depth examination of past compliance. It will end with conclusions and suggestions for further 
research.  
1.1. Sources  
Many compliance studies rely exclusively on statistical data concerning compliance gathered 
by the European Commission. These sources will be briefly reviewed below. However, the 
brief time span of new member states’ compliance records prohibits one from making far-
reaching conclusions. It also points to the need of additional sources. Case studies and 
qualitative research are particularly important in this context.  
This article is therefore based on several cases studies with available statistical data undertaken 
in one new member state. Case studies, in turn, are supplemented by interviews with 
government officials, experts and interest groups conducted in the second half of 2008 in 
Lithuania. Such case studies are still rarely used in compliance literature. Although country 
specific, these conclusions might help to generate hypotheses, which can be tested in a wider 
comparative context.  
There are several important sources of compliance-related data produced by the European 
Commission.  
z First, there is a series of bi-monthly reports covering the progress of EU member states
in transposing EU directives.  
z The second important source is the EC’s scoreboard concerning the implementation of 
internal market directives.  
z The third source is data on infringement procedures initiated by the European 
Commission against the member states.  
Three stages of the infringement process can be distinguished. The first stage is a formal notice 
on possible problems of non-transposition or implementation. The majority of these official
notifications concern a state government’s failure to notify the EU of the transposition in due 
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received. The second stage is a reasoned opinion, and the third is initiation of a case in the 
European Court of Justice or the Court of First Instance. Reasoned opinions and cases pending 
in the Courts are indicators of the extent of seriousness of problems of transposition and 
implementation. The ratio of reasoned opinions to formal notices is a good indicator of the 
ability of an administrative system to deal with problems detected by the European 
Commission and expressed in formal notices. Lithuania was clearly ahead of all other new 
member states(7) with respect to the ability of its administrative system to effectively deal with 
the transposition of EU directives.  
Table 2 about here 
So far, however, there are a limited number of solved cases involving new member states(8). 
Official notifications and reasoned opinions were very few in the first years of membership 
due to the European Commission’s lack of knowledge of a member state – in this case 
Lithuania(9). This is an important fact to consider, which might indicate a systemic bias in the 
utilized data.  
Table 3 about here 
There is an additional source of information on compliance with EU law in Lithuania, which is 
contained in annual reports on the activities of the Government related to the European Union 
(LRVK 2004-2007). These reports contain a separate section devoted to the process of 
transposition and enforcement of EU law in Lithuania.  
1.2. Problems and the research framework  
The research framework is provided in the introductory chapter of this collection. There are 
two important dimensions of a theoretical context relevant to this topic. The first dimension 
relates to the current general state of affairs and conclusions of research on compliance with 
the EU acquis. The second relates to the specific circumstances of new member states and
their particular process of Europeanization. The latter is related to the successful use of 
conditionality which, combined with the powerful enticement of EU membership, brought 
about quick changes in Central and Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). 
The main question of this article specifically and this collection in general is if the degree of 
compliance changes once this powerful pre-accession conditionality no longer has an effect. 
Further specifying the general question of this volume, this contribution explores the main 
reasons for non-implementation in terms of administrative capacities and voluntary non-
implementation.  
These terms are related to a distinction between management and enforcement approaches to 
compliance (Tallberg 2002). The Enforcement approach emphasizes the political will to 
comply as a major cause of a good compliance record. The Management approach places a 
stronger emphasis on administrative capacities, which essentially determine the outcome.  
Finally, there were attempts to address the issue of pre- and post-accession compliance directly 
(Zubek 2005; Falkner and Treib 2008; Sedelmeier 2008). The main issue addressed in this 
literature was the presence of a relatively good track record on transposition after accession 
despite the disappearance of accession conditionalities. This problem became more visible 
when placed in the context of a prevailing suspicion that quickly transposed EU laws were just 
“dead letters”.  
Administrative capacity is understood here as a government’s ability to enforce and implement 
its decisions. It is closely associated with the capacity of the civil service as defined during the 
pre-accession stage (Sigma 1998). Developments of this capacity together with the process of 
EU accession were assessed by the World Bank (World Bank 2006). We will also assume that 
a special system of coordination of transposition and enforcement is an important factor in 
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determined by the relative autonomy of a state with regard to interest groups. This autonomy 
should have diminished after EU accession, as the role of interest groups was no longer kept in 
check by strict pre-accession conditionality.  
The assumption concerning the growing role of interest groups in new EU members states 
form Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the post-accession phase is in line with recent 
research (World Bank 2006; Pridham, 2008; Sigma 2009; Dimitrova 2010). It suggests that re-
politization of the public policy has taken place after accession in these countries. Several new 
tendencies have been observed. First, as the pressure of conditionality eased, there has been a 
return to normal politics characteristic of these countries before the pre-accession stage. 
Second, interest groups generally did not oppose the transposition of new regulations based on 
the EU acquis and EU conditionality, expecting them to remain “dead letters”. And, third, 
there was a tendency toward fragmentation of politics in the CEE demonstrated by higher 
political instability and weaker coalition governments (Grabbe 2007), which increased the role 
of interest groups.  
It might be provisionally assumed that the high standing of Lithuania with respect to 
transposition of EU law is related to two factors. The first is common to all new member states 
and relates to the deliberate choice of these countries to focus their efforts on transposition in 
the pre-accession phase. As this factor is easier to measure, it remains a point of reference in
various implementation studies including implementation reports of the European 
Commission. It is more difficult to track real implementation; i.e. enforcement after the 
adoption of a law.  
The second factor relates to the pre-accession institutional infrastructure. Lithuania kept an 
institutional mechanism for planning and monitoring implementation of the EU acquis largely 
untouched after accession, which might explain positive transposition results in the post-
accession phase(11) and its good record of reasoned opinions. This thesis is similar to the one
offered by Sedelmeier (2009 this issue) and Dimitrova and Toshkov (2009 this issue) who 
argue that a special legislative and coordination capacity could explain a new member state’s 
good track record.  
Our preliminary hypothesis therefore is that administrative capacities created during the 
accession period determine a generally positive track record in the post-accession phase. 
However, this administrative capacity is being weakened in the absence of strong EU 
conditionalities. Moreover, in the absence of a strong EU pressure, the role of interest groups 
is growing, which leads to cases of voluntary non-compliance. Using the approaches of 
management and enforcement, we claim that the pre-accession phase could be better explained 
through the management approach, while an enforcement approach becomes more relevant in 
the post-accession phase. This means that administrative capacities largely determined the 
compliance record in the pre-accession phase. EU conditionality helped deter the political will
to interfere in matters concerning the implementation of EU law. In the post-accession phase, 
this political will is less restrained by the EU and can influence the compliance record through 
voluntary non-compliance or through weakening the administrative structures created to 
ensure compliance during the pre-accession period. In Lithuanian’s case, this leads to the 
hypotheses that, due to a strong administrative capacity inherited from the pre-accession phase, 
all major cases of non-compliance are the result of voluntary non-compliance.  
Finally, we assume that implementation is the result of a simple fear of sanctions implied by 
EU law. Yet another factor is sensitivity to “naming and shaming”, which is seemingly high in 
new member states (Sedelemeier 2008). In addition there could be an administrative inertia 
driving compliance despite the negative cost/benefit ratio for a specific country concerning a 
specific part of the acquis.  
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2.1. The development of pre-accession conditionality and its outcomes   
The development of accession conditionality and its impact on new member states is a well-
researched topic. There were also particular studies conducted on Lithuania in this area 
(Maniokas 2003; Maniokas, Vilpišauskas and Žeruolis 2005). The pressure to reform due to 
pre-accession conditionalities was strong. It was particularly important in Lithuania and the so-
called “second group” of candidate countries, which were not able to begin accession 
negotiations with the first group. The influence was broad in scope because of additional 
membership conditions, such as the Copenhagen criteria and accession partnerships. This time 
period was condensed because, in only a few years, the former candidate countries had to 
transpose and implement the whole acquis. The candidate states were considerably receptive to 
EU influence. This receptivity could be attributed to two factors: One was a weak, or in some 
cases virtually non-existent, institutional structure. This is particularly true for the Baltic States
and Lithuania in particular, which were completing state-building process at that time. And, 
second, the candidate countries had eagerly taken the acquis and other membership conditions 
as a blueprint for their comprehensive transformation and modernization of their economy and 
public sphere. Finally, the acceding countries had no possibility to influence the outcomes of 
European policy-making.  
The result of this enormous impact on the Lithuanian institutional system could be summarized 
by a concept of a regulatory state (Maniokas 2003), which was created through EU-stimulated 
development of regulatory policies and non-majoritarian institutions. The latter could be 
characterized by the institutions’ relative autonomy from political interference and by reliance 
on technical expertise. The EU pressured Lithuania to consolidate the autonomy of judiciary 
and public administration through the use of the political criterion of membership. In the area 
of economic regulation the EU promoted the establishment of an entire set of supervisory 
institutions, which could be labelled non-majoritarian agencies. Their competence was 
safeguarded by relevant laws. These institutions were modelled according to those of other EU 
members, but in many cases were made more autonomous than their counterparts in other 
states.  
Post-accession environment in Lithuania could be characterized by several considerations. 
First, the post-accession EU policy of Lithuania is not ambitious and lacks targeted policy 
goals, explicit agreement on the priorities of the country after accession, or even on major EU-
related issues. Although the Parliament and Government use a system of prioritization 
differentiating particular EU norms to indicate their degree of importance for Lithuania, this 
system is mostly formal and driven by public servants. It is not linked to substantial domestic 
political priorities. This lack of ambition and strategic approach to the EU after accession is 
mainly caused by the lack of political interest in and vision of EU matters. The country’s 
political system remains fragmented and is dominated by coalition governments, which tend to 
focus on domestic concerns. The European neighbourhood policy and energy issues –
particularly the security of energy supply and price increases after the closure of the Ignalina 
nuclear power plant – are two exceptions of issues that receive substantial attention from
coalition governments(12).  
Following accession, there were attempts to reverse institutional reforms, initially to limit the 
autonomy of regulatory agencies established for the implementation of the EU acquis(13). 
This is especially evident in the case of the State Energy Pricing Commission and the 
Competition Council. The State Energy Pricing Commission had experienced periods of 
heightened pressure from the central and municipal governments with regard to the regulation 
of heating prices. The selection of Commission members was reported to be influenced by 
interest groups. Polarization of appointments and activities of the regulatory agencies were 
also observed in other policy areas.  
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the administrative system to political decisions. In an effort to reduce the number of holders of 
budgetary appropriations, a number of regulatory agencies were scheduled for integration into 
the programs of line ministries. The new Government in Lithuania is planning further 
measures in this regard(14).  
The role of interest groups and other social partners in the management of EU affairs was 
limited during the pre-accession phase (Maniokas, Vilpišauskas and Žeruolis 2005). It remains 
limited in the process of coordinating EU policy in the post-accession phase (Maniokas and 
Vilpišauskas forthcoming). Specific lobbies, such as the lobby for manufacturers competing 
with cheaper imports from third countries, are the most active and effective. However, the role 
of interest groups in domestic policy-making is becoming more important. Weak coalition
governments of the post-accession era have depended on powerful interest groups. Domestic
policy, especially economic policy, which was largely isolated from political interference in 
the pre-accession phase, has been in the gradual process of re-politization(15).  
2.2. Institutional infrastructure for coordinating the implementation of EU law 
Institutional infrastructure for tracking transposition and, to a certain extent, implementation, is 
well developed in Lithuania, and has remained rather stable throughout the pre- and post-
accession phases. It could be characterized by  
1. highly developed rules, procedures and a well-functioning exchange of information;  
2. a clear division of competences;  
3. a clear and uncontested leadership of the Department of Co-ordination and Monitoring 
of European Law Implementation in the Office of the Government; and  
4. a functioning mechanism for resolving inter-agency disputes over competences.  
The final example is typically a major cause of non-transposition. If these disputes are resolved 
at an early stage, there is a chance of achieving a positive record in transposition. Points 3 and 
4 are related, as clear institutional leadership contributes heavily to the ability of the system to 
solve disputes over competences. It should also be added that a formal leadership (assignment 
of the coordinating function by a legal act) is well supported by the institutional arrangement 
of the department and civil servants working within it. Most the civil servants continue their 
work from the pre-accession period, and a sense of trust and confidence has developed 
between them and line institutions. A specific factor contributing to the first point is the special 
information management system LINESIS, initially developed during the pre-accession stage 
and then adjusted for the post-accession period. It is considered one of the best systems of its 
kind functioning in EU member states (World Bank 2006, assessment of interviewed experts). 
The system has a specific sub-component developed to plan the transposition and enforcement
of the newly adopted acquis, as well as to monitor it.  
Transposition or implementation of every newly adopted EU legal act is assigned to a 
responsible Lithuanian institution, which further engages in the planning, preparation, adoption 
and implementation of necessary measures. Within three weeks of the assignment, responsible 
institutions have to submit concrete plans for the transposition and implementation of the act to 
the Office of the Government. Following the submission, a single national program for 
transposition and implementation of EU law is prepared and constantly updated. The program 
specifies the dates for preparation and adoption of relevant Lithuanian laws. This plan and 
briefings on its implementation are presented and discussed monthly in the meetings of the 
Ministries’ State Secretaries. Arising problems are addressed in special meetings organized by
the Office of the Government, while the most difficult questions are included into the agenda 
of the Government’s Strategic Planning Committee or the Government’s meetings. Questions 
related to drafting and adoption of laws that implement the provisions of EU law are discussed 
every month in the meetings of the Committee on European Affairs of the Parliament.  
On average, Lithuanian institutions transpose over 100 directives into national law every year, 
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30 Government regulations and 200 legal acts on the level of Ministerial orders are adopted 
annually. These tasks are accomplished by using the LINESIS information management 
system.  
Figure 1 about here  
3. Implementation of EU law after accession  
Several cases were selected to test if implementation of the EU acquis in Lithuania is as good 
as transposition, and to look for possible explanations. First, we will look into the cases of 
infringement that attempt to establish if these cases are linked to a lack of administrative 
capacities or if they are cases of voluntary non-compliance. Then we will examine two cases 
of attempted voluntary non-implementation. The first case is the case of closure of the Ignalina
Nuclear Power Plant (Ignalina NPP). It was a major, though unsuccessful, attempt of voluntary 
non-implementation following accession. It may therefore help to look into the new
mechanisms replacing pre-accession conditionality. The second case is a seemingly successful 
attempt of voluntary non-implementation related to the second Gas Directive 2003/55/EC.  
3.1. Cases of possible infringement  
There were only three such cases initiated against Lithuania in 2004-2007. In the field of 
telecommunications, on June 7, 2007, the European Commission initiated a case against 
Lithuania for the possible breach of obligations under Directive 2002/22/EC on universal 
services (Article 26.3). It was related to a failure to set-up a fully functioning service to be 
provided through the emergency number 112. This issue was not specific to Lithuania; The EC 
initiated action against 13 member states regarding this particular directive (6 of them were 
new member states). The reason for non-implementation was the considerable budgetary and 
organizational resources needed for the infrastructure of this service. This case can hardly be 
related to voluntary non-implementation. The second case was related to Directive 2001/83/EC
as amended by the Directive 2003/63/EC on the marketing of pharmaceuticals within the EU 
internal market. The EC accused Lithuania of authorizing the marketing of a product that did 
not satisfy the requirements of this directive. The case has not been closed yet, and it is also 
not an obvious case of non-implementation. However, in this instance there was an obvious
presence of an interest-based line of action, as this product is produced by a Lithuanian
company that exercised a considerable pressure on the Government to authorize marketing of 
the product. Furthermore, a counter-balancing pressure was exerted by a US pharmaceutical 
company that wished to protect its own product. Even if the final outcome of the case is 
disregarded, the case indicates an increasingly important role of interest groups in the process 
of implementation of EU law. Administrative capacities hardly played a role in this case.  
The third case concerned citizenship requirement for the exercising of professional activities of 
notaries, which the European Commission considered in breach of provisions of the Directive 
89/48/EEC regarding the recognition of diplomas. In this case, Lithuania was brought to the 
Court along with other member states, including Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and 
Luxembourg. This case is hardly a straightforward case of non-implementation as it relates to a 
genuine difference of interpretation of the provisions of EU law.  
To conclude, while the number of cases in which Lithuania was referred to the Court by the 
European Commission has been very limited and their resolutions still uncertain, only one of 
the three cases is related to the presence of interest groups. Due to a limited number of cases of 
infringements, there is a need to look into the cases of attempted infringements and cases of de 
facto non-implementation, which were not registered formally. The first case study was chosen
by its significance. It deals with a major attempt of infringement publicly undertaken by the 
Government of Lithuania. The second case was selected by looking into the areas where the 
stakes for voluntary non-compliance could be high due to the economic importance and 
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This definite choice for the second case is the sector of energy. It is significant economically, 
and powerful economic interest groups are present, such as owners of vertically integrated 
companies targeted by EU law to be functionally or legally separated. We will look into the 
main issues of compliance in this area and will analyse the implementation of one important 
piece of the EU acquis. The second case will concern de facto non-implementation.  
3.2. Closure of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant  
This is an effective case to test the rationale behind compliance before and after accession. The 
Ignalina NPP was likely the most important issue during Lithuania’s accession negotiations 
(Maniokas and Stanionis, 2005). Closure of the plant was an informal condition of Lithuanian 
membership in the EU. Negotiations concerned closing two Chernobyl type reactors of 
Lithuania’s only nuclear power plant, which generated approximately 80% of the energy in
Lithuania, in exchange for EU assistance.  
Negotiations with the EU on the decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP began in 1999, well 
before the official start of EU membership negotiations. To a great extent, this issue 
determined public opinion regarding the outcome of accession negotiations. Lithuania had to 
agree to the EU’s principal position to close the plant, but managed to attain considerable 
compensation, which the EU initially did not intend to grant. At Lithuania’s insistence, the EU 
accepted that decommissioning of Ignalina NPP was a matter that concerned the entire EU and 
therefore had to be solved in solidarity. It also admitted that the decommissioning costs were 
related not only to a direct decommissioning of the NPP, but also to the modernization of the 
entire energy sector of Lithuania. As a consequence, a special EU financial facility was 
deployed to address both closure and modernization of the conventional energy sector. The EU 
also admitted that assistance to decommission the INPP would be a long process and had to be 
fixed by legal rather than political measures. A special protocol on the subject was annexed to 
the Accession Treaty.  
The first reactor of the Ignalina NPP was closed, as foreseen, in 2004. The closure of the 
second is due at the end of 2009. The post-accession years, and especially the years 2007-
2008, were marked by an attempt of the Lithuanian Government to postpone the closure of the 
Ignalina NPP and could be interpreted as an attempt of voluntary non-compliance in the new 
post-accession context.  
The first serious attempt to postpone the closure of the Ignalina NPP and to renegotiate the 
Accession Treaty was undertaken by the newly-elected president of Lithuania immediately 
after accession in 2004. He made postponement explicit in his election campaign and kept his 
promise by raising the issue with leaders of EU member states.  
The second attempt to open the issue was undertaken in 2007-2008. The debates took place 
within the framework of the adoption of the new national energy strategy confirming the final 
closure of Ignalina NPP at the end of 2009. The Lithuanian Parliament adopted the strategy 
only conditionally by asking the Government to undertake an analysis of the consequences of 
the closure, to consult with the European Commission and to inform the Lithuanian Parliament 
accordingly, as well as EU member states(16). This was an indirect mandate for the 
Government to start the renegotiation of closure dates. A number of studies were undertaken in 
2007 to prove tremendous difficulties associated with the final closure of the NPP. Informal 
consultations with the European Commission and Member States intensified throughout 2007. 
The response from the EU, however, was a very cool and unequivocal “no”. Nobody wanted to 
open Pandora’s box, particularly given Bulgaria’s failed attempts to renegotiate the closure 
dates of their own nuclear power station.  
A third attempt was made in the second half of 2007 after a change of Government in 
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Ignalina NPP as one of the priorities of his Government. A special task force was created by 
the Government at the beginning of 2008, headed by a former prime minister of Lithuania(17). 
It was officially mandated by the Government to investigate problems related to the security of 
the supply of energy to Lithuania after 2009. It was presented to the public as a team of 
negotiators tasked to re-negotiate the closure of Ignalina NPP and to extend the date of its
operation by at least three years(18).  
The team undertook several studies, which were discussed with the European Commission and 
presented to member states, and was also discussed in a number of official fora including the 
EU Councils of Energy, Environment and European Council(19). It mobilized all responsible 
ministries and agencies. This issue was included in the agendas of all major meetings between 
the Lithuanian government officials and their EU counterparts at the highest level. Even a 
special referendum was held on the issue on October 12, 2008.  
The attempt to postpone closure of the NPP failed after the European Commission and EU 
member states did not accept Lithuania’s position and threatened to use all possible sanctions 
to deter Lithuania. As the head of the special task force has put it, the EU had clearly indicated 
that any attempt to breach the terms of the Accession Treaty would be “a disaster”. 
Apparently, it worked. The conclusion was that the political and possible financial costs of a 
unilateral breach of EU law would be too high. A new government formed after the October 
2008 elections, and while it was aggressive on the issue before elections, it dropped the case in 
a low-key manner and accepted a bigger CO2 quota as an additional compensation in the 
December 2008 European Council.  
It seems that this case demonstrates that a mix of credible threats of sanctions and potential 
political damage(20) replaced the role of pre-accession conditionality.  
3.3. Implementation of the Second Gas Directive 2003/55/EC and other 
measures on the liberalization of an energy market  
Implementation of EU norms in the energy industry is a good case for a compliance study as 
there are strong economic interests in this industry and, accordingly, strong motives for 
voluntary non-compliance with problematic provisions of the acquis.  
The Lithuanian public policy context of the past three years was largely dominated by energy 
issues and, in particular, by an attempt to create a national vertically-integrated energy 
company in Lithuania. It was finally created in 2008, allegedly for the purpose of building a 
new nuclear power station as well as electric interconnectors with Poland and Sweden. 
Creation of this company could be regarded as a reversal of previous reforms undertaken to 
separate electricity transmission and distribution companies as a response to the EU electricity 
directive. One distribution company was even privatized. It was not by accident that the new 
owners of this distribution company strongly lobbied for the recreation of a vertically-
integrated company as a private-public partnership (PPP) initiative. This case can hardly be
formally attributed to a case of non-compliance, but the move was clearly against the aims and
spirit of a directive. Strong economic interests were obviously at work.  
A case related to the liberalization of the gas industry is also quite complex. The issue of 
compliance with EU law in this industry has re-emerged in the context of a third energy 
liberalization package, where the issue of splitting vertically-integrated monopolies in the gas 
sector of the EU was central. The European Commission proposals issued in 2007 were built 
on the previous two gas directives of 1998 and 2003 respectively. The European Commission 
considered the previous measures inadequate, as vertically-integrated monopolies blocked the 
creation of infrastructure necessary for EU-wide trade in gas.  
The aim of the second gas directive was to promote faster liberalization of the gas market by 
introducing, among other things, measures similar to those in the electricity industry, such as 
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integrated gas companies and separation of accounts related to these activities.  
Lithuania did not transpose this directive until 2005 and, accordingly, did not notify the 
transposition to the European Commission. The first warning letter from the European 
Commission followed. Amendments to the Law on Natural Gas were debated for a 
considerable amount of time in the Parliament and caused major disagreements among the 
ruling coalition between the Social Democrats and the Labour party. The founder and leader of 
the Labour party had special interests in the natural gas industry. It seems that the Social 
Democratic party was also influenced by opposing interest groups. The major point of 
disagreement was the regulation of gas prices.  
Then, in 2005, Lithuania notified the European Commission of its intention to use the 
exemption clause of the 2003 amended gas directive because of the physical isolation of 
Lithuania. It was a valid argument indeed, as Lithuania was connected to the only source of 
gas. Thus competition between suppliers was possible only nominally. There were three 
companies supplying gas to Lithuania at the time, but they were all directly or indirectly 
controlled by the Russian gas company Gazprom.  
However, the Labour party was forced to withdraw from the coalition, and the amendments 
were subsequently adopted and the European Commission was notified of transposition. The 
willingness to use the exemption was therefore forgotten, and the relevant provisions of the 
directive, including those on separation, were fully transposed. It created a complex legal 
situation in the context of transposition.  
While Lithuania transposed the provisions of the two previous gas directives, their main 
provisions remained unimplemented. While there could be different views with regard to the 
qualification of the fact of infringement, it was clear that the essential provisions of the law 
were not implemented. The functional separation of transmission and distribution prescribed 
by the Second Gas Directive was not undertaken.  
Functional separation was not the main issue at stake, because the debate revolved around the 
regulation of prices and the establishment of a cap on profits. However, functional unbundling 
created a possibility to split AB Lietuvos dujos (the Lithuanian Gas Company).  
Lietuvos dujos admitted to the fact of non-implementation openly and argued that this 
separation was useless. Whenever the issue was raised, the company threatened the 
Government it would demand higher tariffs on the transportation of gas if forced to implement 
the directive. The threat was based on the false argument of high costs of functional separation, 
but the real issue was Gasprom’s threat to raise the price of Russian gas sold to Lithuania.  
The Government and the Ministry of the Economy, which was responsible for implementation, 
silently agreed with the gas company. The European Commission initiated an investigation 
into the matter and sent questionnaires regarding implementation of the directive. However, 
the Commission did not start an infringement procedure, most likely due to the highly complex 
legal situation and the need to have Lithuania support the third liberalization package.  
4. Conclusions  
This was a single country case study on compliance with EU law following accession. 
However, hypotheses formulated in this case can also be tested in a comparative context. 
Lithuania was chosen because it was the best performer with respect to compliance with EU 
law among member states who joined in 2004. Using the approaches of management and 
enforcement, we claimed that the pre-accession phase could be better explained through the 
management approach, and an enforcement approach was more relevant in the post-accession 
phase. In the Lithuanian case, this amounted to an argument that, due to a strong 
administrative capacity inherited from the pre-accession phase, all major cases of non-
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mechanisms that replaced conditionality as the main driver of compliance. This article was 
based on several case studies, which remain rare among compliance literature.  
The cases analyzed do not indicate an existence of an under-world of “dead letters”. Lithuania 
indeed appears to be a good performer concerning compliance with EU law. The laws 
transposed are subsequently applied and enforced. This is mainly due to a well-functioning 
administrative system designed for this purpose during the pre-accession phase, despite the 
fact that it focuses on the transposition of EU law. We found several cases of non-compliance 
due to administrative reasons after accession, such as the case of the creation of the emergency 
112 service, but they remain very limited.  
However, the picture is far from rosy. Public policy after accession in Lithuania became more 
politicized as coalition governments became weaker and interest groups grew stronger. In this 
context, cases of voluntary non-compliance emerged as a problem. De facto non-enforcement 
of an importance piece of the acquis in the energy industry, namely the Second Gas Directive, 
demonstrated that special institutional structures for the coordination of implementation of EU 
law could not cope with it.  
It is also quite likely that further politization of the administration will take place in Lithuania 
and other new member states. The current EU affairs coordination infrastructure, including an 
infrastructure dealing with compliance with, EU law, is being dismantled in Lithuania. The 
role of the administration and regulatory agencies might be weakened further, thus creating a 
problem of administrative capacities and corresponding problems of compliance. If the trend 
of weak coalition governments continues, the number of cases of voluntary non-compliance is 
likely to grow. New member states might indeed become part of a separate world where EU 
law exists and functions only on paper.  
However, it seems that this problem can be controlled, as the fear of sanctions and the 
reputational damage remain a powerful deterrence against non-compliance. The EU has not 
lost its grip on new member states; the case of closure of the Ignalina NPP demonstrated that 
the fear of sanctions and resulting reputational damage has replaced pre-accession 
conditionality as the main driver of compliance.  
Further comparative case studies are needed to complement European Commission reports on 
compliance. As the number of cases initiated against new member states in European courts is 
likely to grow, they will also provide a new pool of data concerning the actual enforcement of 
EU law. Only then can we better observe the application and enforcement of EU law. These 
new data can also help test if the fear of sanctions can actually stop this slow but sure trend of 
weakening the administrative capacity of new member states.  
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Endnotes 
(*) I would like to thank Deividas Kriaučiūnas, Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, Darius Žėruolis and all authors of this 
special issue for their comments and suggestions. I am particularly grateful to Antoaneta Dimitrova for her 
extensive comments and encouragement to participate.  
(1) Lithuania was consistently either top performer or among the top three performers with respect to both 
transposition and infringements. See European Commission Reports and Annual Reports of the Office of the 
Government of Lithuania (European Commission, various years and LRVK, various years).  
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http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-020a.htm 12(2) Data provided by the European Commission in its databases of transposition and infringements concern 
only member states. Data on transposition and enforcement of EU law for candidate countries can be found in 
the European Commission progress reports, but they are difficult to compare.  
(3) Comparison by sector is especially difficult as different accidental factors, such as activism of a European 
Commission service, might play a disproportionate role.  
(4) Implementation is difficult to define, and it is difficult to establish clear confirmation of non-
implementation. Case studies must be used for this purpose.  
(5) Application of EU law in courts is difficult to establish for methodological reasons. Special research into 
the decisions of courts and reference to EU law in their decisions and deliberations could be helpful, but 
difficult to undertake due to limited accessibility and high costs. According to the opinion of lawyers 
practicing civil law in Lithuania, Lithuanian courts are still quite reluctant to apply EU law in relevant cases. 
However, this situation is slowly changing. Much also depends on the ability and willingness of economic 
agents to use the opportunities offered by EU law. Both ability and willingness still appear limited in 
Lithuania. 
(6) Two-thirds of infringement procedures initiated against Lithuania in 2007 were related to the failure to 
notify EU officials of problems encountered in the transposition of directives on time (LRVK 2007: 61).  
(7) We take only 10 new member states, as we disregard Romania and Bulgaria in order to use more data.  
(8) In the list of recent infringement cases solved by the European Court of Justice provided by the European 
Commission, there are only five cases against new member states: four against the Czech Republic (all 
concerning pharmaceuticals) and one against Malta.  
(9) This can also be explained by the fact that information on possible infringements is better supplied to the 
European Commission if there is a sufficient number of former civil servants and other citizens of a particular 
member state working in the Commission. This is important bearing in mind language issues and an 
understanding of a particular administrative tradition. A limited number of citizens from new member states 
employed by the European Commission in the early years of accession might also explain a limited number of 
infringement cases.  
(10) This argument has been developed in a comparative context in another contribution to the special issue 
by Dimitrova and Toshkov (2009). 
(11) This argument must be supported by comparative studies. While it is not a subject of this single country 
case study, a comparison between Lithuania and Latvia could be quite illustrating. The dismantling of the 
European Integration Bureau in Latvia could be a reason why the transposition record of Latvia deteriorated 
after accession and Lithuania remained at the top of the best performing countries (World Bank 2006).  
(12) See Maniokas and Vilpišauskas (2007) for a more extensive review of post-accession Lithuania.  
(13) There is a recent case of an infringement procedure regarding the telecommunications regulatory agency. 
The key requirement in this and many other areas relates to the separation of a regulatory function from those 
relating to the disposal and management of property rights. The European Commission believed that this 
requirement was not observed.  
(14) See the activities of the so-call Sunset Commission established for governance reform 
http://www.lrv.lt/lt/veikla/komisijos/saulelydzio-komisija/komisijos-veikla/ (accessed on 11 December 2009). 
The main proposal of this Commission during the first half of 2009 was to integrate the majority of 
institutions under the Government into line ministries. However, only a limited number of these proposals 
have been passed by the Parliament.  
(15) See World Bank (2006) for a similar conclusion with respect to all new member states.  
(16) Decision No. X-1047 of the Lithuanian Parliament of 18 January /2007 On Implementation of the 
National Energy Strategy.  
(17) It was formed on February, 26 2008, by the Lithuanian Government decree No. 187.  
(18) In fact, fully aware of the difficulties of formal re-negotiations of the Accession Treaty, the Task Force 
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http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-020a.htm 13tried to persuade the EU to re-interpret the terms of the Accession Treaty only.  
(19) The Head of the Task Force alone performed 33 visits during 9 months of the work of the Task Force.  
(20) This can confirm the statement of Sedelmeier (2008) about vulnerability of the new member states to 
shaming by the EU institutions.  
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Infringement procedures – break down per stage reached, legal basis, Member State and sector, p. 10 and
author’s own calculations. 
  
Table 2: Reasoned opinions per new EU member states (10) 
2005 - 2007 
European Commission, 25th Annual Report on the Application of Community Law (2008), Annex II, 
Infringement procedures – break down per stage reached, legal basis, Member State and sector. 
New EU member state 2005 2006 2007 Total
CZ 72 54 84 210
EE 59 64 61 184
CY 83 47 63 193
LV 57 54 59 170
PL 58 75 103 236
LT 26 33 41 100
MT 55 77 97 229
SK 51 37 54 142
SI 55 47 65 167
HU 52 50 71 173
New EU member state 2005 2006 2007 Total 
CZ  40  18  13  71 
EE 18  12  9  39 
CY 14  20  7  41 
LV  18  12  4  34 
PL  18  21  24  63 
LT 1  10  5  16 
MT 19  18  16  53 
SK  21  17  3  41 
SI 17  14  5  36 
HU 10  18  6  34 
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Table 3: Referral to the Court per new EU member state (10) 
2004 - 2007 
European Commission, 25th Annual Report on the Application of Community Law (2008), Annex II, 
Infringement procedures – break down per stage reached, legal basis, Member State and sector. 
  
Figure 1: Administrative system coordinating transposition and 
implementation of EU Law in Lithuania 
 
Source: Office of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 
http://www.euro.lt/img/koordinavimas/Teises%20perkelimo%20schema_EN.bmp (accessed on 13 
December 2009) 
New EU member state 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
CZ  -  0  4  5  9 
EE  -  1  2  0  3 
CY  -  0  0  1  1 
LV  -  0  0  0  0 
PL  -  0  3  7  10 
LT  -  0  0  1 1 
MT  -  0  3  3  6 
SK  -  0  2  1  3 
SI  -  0  0  1  1 
HU  -  0  0  2  2 
© 2009 by Klaudijus Maniokas
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-020a.htm 16